The Three Questions
Dec. 14th, 2018 10:24 am![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png)
Kindness theory holds that among the ethical stances of any given moral agent, there are some that are necessary, some that are beneficial, and some that are merely nice.
A necessary ethical stance is one such that, if a moral agent fails to uphold it, other moral agents are justified in interfering against that agent. For instance, "I refuse to own slaves" is a necessary ethical stance, and accordingly, raids on slave-owners to free their slaves and destroy their slave-driving equipment are morally justified.
A beneficial ethical stance is one that has clear benefits such that all moral agents should take it, but, if a moral agent chooses not to, their peers are not justified in coercing them. "I should not spit on the sidewalk" is a beneficial ethical stance. Is it kind to spit on the sidewalk? No. Would it be kind to get in someone's face and say "you clean that up right now, or else"? Also no.
A nice ethical stance is one that a particular moral agent values, but does not believe every moral agent should value. I, personally, make an effort to avoid using the words "good" and "bad" in ethical discussions. This is my choice, and I make it for moral reasons, but I don't believe those reasons apply to everyone else.
This three-tier system is a method of summarizing a key concept in kindness theory: that of proportionate response.
Necessary ethical stances can ethically be mandated with some level of force, though only cautiously. Beneficial ethical stances cannot, but can be promoted by other means, such as education, social marketing, and structural design. The nature of nice ethical stances is such that directly encouraging their formation in others is not desired; however, they may be spread through discussion to similar moral agents.
Memorizing this entire essay for application would be impractical. That's why there is also a much shorter formulation of this structure, focusing on evaluating a particular action.
- Me: Do I have a moral right to take the action?
- People: Do people have a moral right to take the action?
- Enforcement: Do people have a moral right to stop others from taking the action?
Often, when I apply these three questions to actions I'm repulsed by, I find that I have strong or weak arguments against the action (not my right and perhaps not people's right) but conclude that they don't justify force (no right of enforcement). Answering the first two questions validates the instinctive feeling that the action is wrong, and once I've done that, it's easier for me to answer the third in a considered, level-headed fashion.